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ABSTRACT 
 
The decline in defined benefit plans has been offset by a significant growth in defined contribution 
plans. An important consideration in this phenomenon lies in the fact that employees view this 
shift as a tradeoff between longevity risk and portability rewards. Companies are shifting from 
defined benefit plans to avoid the longevity risks associated with such plans. On the other hand, in 
some instances when given the option, employees chose defined contribution plans, due to the 
associated portability rewards where participants have a choice of rolling over, or transferring 
plans from former employers.. This paper examined research relevant in assessing factors 
contributing to growth in defined contribution with particular interest in 401(k)s and the 
relationship between investment returns, the availability of loans, and investment strategy that 
may affect plan growth. It is concluded that there is insufficient evidence for assuming a 
relationship between investment returns, loan availability and investment strategy and the growth 
of defined contribution plans.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ith the increasing growth in 401(k)s extensive research on the topic of the growth of defined 
contribution plans, little is known about the factors that significantly influence such growth. We 
decided to investigate obvious factors that may influence this growth. The growth of defined 
contribution appears to have outpaced defined benefit plans. Several factors contributed to this growth. Over the last 
decades, Americans have witnessed significant changes in their retirement plans. These changes have a two-fold 
effect, where we have seen a decreasing number of employers offering defined benefit plans, while there is a 
significant shift to the number of employers offering defined contribution plans. This trend in pension plans 
translates into what can be described as a shifting of longevity risk from the employer to the employee. Most 
employees face the reality of this phenomenon, by accepting their responsibility in providing for their own 
retirement. We investigated this serious development and examined three factors and their impact on the growth of 
defined contribution plans with specific interest in 401k plans. The Investment Company Institute (2010) reports 
that as of September 2009, $15.6 trillion was invested in total retirement assets. Of this amount, $3.9 trillion was 
invested in employer-based defined contribution retirement plans with $2.7 trillion represented investments in 401 
(k) plans, and accounts for an increase of $3.6 trillion and $2.4 trillion respectively over the period June 30, 2009.  
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DEFINED BENEFIT AND DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS  
 
We will look at the basic differences or characteristics of both plans. For a defined benefit plan all assets 
invested in a plan are owned by the employer. In addition to the ownership, the employer also directs the investment 
activities and bears the risk associated with the plan. All benefits related to this defined benefit plan are guaranteed 
by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. (PBGC). Employees do not have access to funds except when they 
W 
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retire and are paid an annuity. If an employee dies, the plan allows for a survivor benefits for spouses. In a defined 
contribution plan, an employer makes a promise to contribute a specific amount such as a percentage of an 
employee’s salary, and benefits are tied to the amount invested and the returns generated from the investment. 
Contributions comprise both employer and employee funds.  A drawback to this plan may be that employees bear 
the risk when compared to defined benefit plans. A feature that may contribute to the growth of defined contribution 
plans may be the fact that employees do have access to funds prior to retirement, in the form of loans or hardship 
withdrawals.  
   
EVIDENCE OF CHANGES IN PENSION PLANS STRUCTURE AND GROWTH 
 
Data from the U.S Department of Labor report (2007) show that as of 2005, there were 65 million 
Americans enrolled in 401k plans that accounted for 2.4 trillion assets. In comparing the growth in defined benefit 
plans Gale, Papke, and VanDheri (1999) found that for the period 1975 to 1983, defined benefit plans rose from 
103,000 to 175, 000, a 70 percent increase., and  between the period 1990 –1995 those plans decreased  by 101, 000 
in 1990, and saw a further decreased to 70, 000. In contrast, defined contribution plans grew from 207, 000 to 
623,000 for the year 1995. The authors suggest that the trend in 401(k)s replacing defined benefit plans is also 
evidenced in the fact that since 1995, for every defined benefit  plan that is terminated, two 401k plans that are 
introduced.    
 
REASONS FOR CHOICE OF 401(K)  
 
Defined contribution plans have a lower administrative cost compared to defined benefit plans. It therefore, 
appears that the cost factor could be a significant determinant where both employees and employers would have a 
preference for defined contributions.  Employers may prefer the cost effectiveness, and employees enjoy the tax-
deferred saving and employer matching. Clark, Goodfellow, Shieber and Warwick (1999) reported that half of 
workers age 20-29 with earnings less than 15,000 made contributions to their 401(k) plans suggesting that 401(k)s 
could be a supplement as opposed to a replacement to defined benefits. Papke (1995) also found that 401(k) plans 
show good potential in the growth of retirement plans. Papke studied the participation and contribution effects of 
employer match. The results showed substantial increases in employee contributions when employer match 
increases to a moderate level, and a decrease in employee contributions when employer match increases to higher 
levels. Munnell and Perun (2006) reports that 401k plans have experienced a significant increase where all 
dimensions of plans have increased from between 30 and 50 percentage points of total defined contribution plans to 
approximately 90 percentage. Andrews (1992 points to the growth and suggests that it includes plans that are 
converted thrifts, while Kruse (1995) sees the growth  in contribution plans as related the declining number of 
participants among firms that maintain defined benefit plans and only four percentage of growth resulting from 
termination of defined benefit plans. Other data on growth suggests that large proportions of defined contribution 
plan assets originated before 1982, (Engen, Gale and Scholz, 1996, b).    
  
EVIDENCE FROM PLAN RETURNS 
 
Several factors have been found to influence the growth of defined contribution plans. In view of this 
growth we focused our investigation on the investment returns, the availability of 401 (k) loans, and investment 
strategy as possible factors that may affect plan returns. We reviewed several studies and used data from Watson 
Wyatt Data Services and Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI). Employees in general feel that it is important 
for them to manage their own contribution plans. Citing the portability and longevity risk factors, employees 
consider self management as a way of avoiding the longevity risk to returns from defined contribution plans. We 
examined plan returns for both defined benefit and defined contribution for the period 1995 – 2006. Watson Wyatt 
(2007) reported that from a historical point of view, larger pension plans usually realize higher returns. This 
difference stems from the fact that in general larger plans have access to a variety of investment options and their 
experience and expertise in operations usually provides for the benefits of economies of scale. Using asset weighted 
median rates of returns, Watson Wyatt found that between 1995 and 2006, defined benefit plans outperformed 401k 
plans overall with a rate of 1.09 percentage (Figure 1). Most important, was the performance of defined benefit 
plans, whose performance was significant during the years 2003 through 2006. This is of added significance since 
this period represents a downward cycle in market conditions. When the data is disaggregated and weighted by size, 
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results indicate that defined benefit plans falling under the largest one sixth, reported an overall higher return of 1.21 
percentage points over defined contribution plans for the period 1995 through 2006 , Figure 1a). For plans 
accounting for the largest one half of plans weighted by median returns, defined benefit outperformed defined 
contribution plans by 0.82 percentage point (figure 2). Plans representing the smallest one sixth showed that defined 
contribution plans outperformed defined benefit plans by 1.03 percentage points, (figure 2a). In analyzing the data, 
there is support that higher returns were realized from the larger defined benefit plans compared to those of the 
smaller defined contribution plans.      
 
DIFFERENCES IN RETURNS   
 
One of the reasons for differences in plan returns may be due to disproportionate costs in both plans, and 
how returns are affected by expenses that are integral to plan administration. Hustead (1998) indicates that costs of a 
defined benefit plan ranges from 3.10 of pay in 1996 to 0.23 percent of pay, while costs for defined contribution 
falls within the range of 1.44 percentage of payroll to 0.16. Here we find that differences in administrative costs are 
based on the commitment to both plans. While a defined plan benefit is committed to the promise of a fixed pension 
upon retirement, a defined contribution plan commits to an annual contribution only. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
regulates the size and tax preferences for plans and their sponsors with regulation that requires adequate funding in 
the absence of tax abuse. Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), clearly determines the funding 
status of defined benefit plans, and plan sponsors are required to pay insurance premiums to the Pension Benefit 
Guarantee Corporation (PBGC). Watson Wyatt (2007, suggests that data from Form 5500 may not represent a fair 
comparison, of both plans in terms of the nature of costs that are accounted for in investment income. The data 
points to the average weighted expense related to mutual funds, and their effect of reducing rates of returns. 
Supporting this view Watson Wyatt provides data for the period 2006, where 39 percentage points of plan assets for 
defined contribution plans were invested in mutual funds compared to 10 percentages for defined benefit plans. With 
such differences, and having 33 percent of mutual fund fees as part of administrative costs, an overall effect is a 
reduction on defined contribution returns. Therefore, administrative costs charged by investment companies have an 
important effect on investment rates. Defined contribution plans do not contain a commitment of benefits to be paid 
upon retirement instead an employer makes contributions based on percentage of an employee’s salary while the 
employee remains in tenure with the employer. The good news for defined contribution plan sponsors is that they do 
not have the added obligation of paying PBGC premiums since defined contribution funds are not insured. 
 
PRIOR STUDIES OF 401K LOAN PROVISION AND LOAN ACTIVITY 
 
We looked at another possible factor that may affect the growth of 401(k) plans and its associated returns. 
Prior research indicates that plans offering loan provision increase participation and contribution rates. Therefore an 
added feature of loan availability may also increase participation and contribution thus increasing plan assets. A 
General Accounting Office (1997) report noted that pension-plan borrowing increases participation. The study also 
reported that plans with loan provision show a six percentage point increase over plans without. Results of the study 
noted that proponents of 401(k) borrowings view the privilege as a means to increasing participation where such 
participation was voluntary. Additionally, proponents see borrowing as having the effect of increased contributions 
when participants also determine the level of their contributions. The opposing view sees pension borrowing as 
having the effect of lowering pension income upon retirement. The GAO study also points to interest rates on loans 
in general that have lower than yields compared to pensions that are not affected by borrowing. The GOA study also 
showed that for 1988, over 95 percent of 401k plans with a loan privilege, had at least one participant with an 
outstanding loan. 
 
We examined data provided by the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) for years 1998 through 
2008 to assess the impact of 401(k) loans on the related assets. Data show that large plans are more likely to have 
loan features, (Figure 3). The data compares percentage of participants enrolled in plans with loan features, 
percentage of participants with outstanding loans, and the average loan balance for the respective years. Although 
there is little variation in percentage of participants enrolled in plans, the EBRI data showed that overall the number 
of participants with a loan balance ranged between 13 and 18 percentages, and loan balances experienced 1.43 
percentage increases to 4.1 percentage decrease. Participants enrolled in plans with loan features ranged between 82- 
90 percentages. Beshears, Laibson, Choi, and Madrian (2008) concluded that 401 (k) loans may serve as a vehicle 
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for increasing “net asset accumulation”, which in turn can have a positive impact on participation. Although seen as 
a possible source of credit, loans from 401 (k) plans do not have a significant effect on wealth accumulation. Li, and 
Smith (2008) suggests that in calculating loans utilization, a measure of loan balance compared to the maximum 
loan allowable, 401(k) borrowers used loan availability to a lesser extent than they could. Authors suggest that 
households could gain from using 401(k) loans. This can be done by “shifting high cost debt” from credit cards and 
auto loans to 401(k) loans.   
 
INVESTMENT STRATEGY AND RISK   
 
Because of the insignificant impact of investment returns and loan availability on the growth of 401(k) 
plans, we explored whether investment strategy plays a role in investment returns. For the third quarter of 2009, ICI 
(2010) reported defined contribution assets held $2622 billion in mutual funds supporting the view that a large 
amount of plan assets are held in equity. Employees often express that they are better able to decide on the best 
investment strategy that maximizes returns and lowers risk on their defined contribution plans. However, Bernheim 
(1996) describes employees as not having sufficient financial experience to make sound decisions in defined 
contribution savings plans. Bryne (2004) suggests that defined contribution participants display attitudes to risk 
portfolio that differ from accepted investment principles. Part of this finding may be due to a perception that 
management of an employees’ portfolio is more left to fund managers. Bernartzi and Thaler (1999), found that 
investors appear to experience “myopic loss aversion’ where investors avoid short-term losses although long term 
planning is central to retirement. Their results show that participants appear to use a more conservative approach 
towards equity, when compared to other participants. However, in their 2002 study Bernartzi and Thaler also found 
that there was a high ratio of equity funds when compared to bond funds, and participants were inclined to have a 
preference of higher than average allocations to equities. Such preferences in investment strategy bear a direct 
dependence on market performance and do have a significant impact when there is a downward trend in market 
conditions. Employees often hold investments in an employer’s equity plan. The case of Enron is mostly as an 
example of the effects of investing in an employer’s equity. Enron’s employees invested almost 58 percentage points 
of 401(k) assets in the company’s stock. Most of the equity was lost to the bankruptcy filings of Enron. Benartzari 
and Thaler (2001) also suggest that this happens when plan sponsors essentially have more equity funds in 
portfolios, and  participants will then naturally chose from those available funds when presented with options. 
Watson Wyatt (2007) supports the view that asset allocation whether by a plan participant or strategies of the plan 
sponsor, does serve as an important determinant on the success of plans. In general, workers who have an advantage 
in age, education, and are risk averse, do seem to allocate more equity to defined contribution portfolios. Watson 
Wyatt lends support and compares these findings to their analyses of asset allocations in defined contribution plans. 
Accordingly, participants who do not have the benefit of a defined benefit plan and  are  therefore dependent on a 
defined contribution plan need more guidance in making asset allocation decisions. Madarin and Shea (2001) 
concludes that new cohorts in their study had 80 percent of contributions allocated to money market, and 16 
percentage invested in stock funds.  Old cohorts on the other hand allocate approximately 70 percentage of 401(k) 
contributions to stock funds (equity) while less than 10 percentage is allocated to money market funds, and 90 
percentage of participants are likely to invest in equity while less than 20 percentage age are likely to invest in 
money market funds. This pattern indicates that more seasoned employees may have more experience with equity 
allocations and are therefore less risk averse. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) suggest that investor increases in equity 
investments may be attributed to new equity funds available in the bull markets of the 1990s, their concern was for 
the design of retirement savings plan, and whether age should be factored in the design.   
      
DISCUSSION 
 
Investment returns on 401 (k) plans do not exceed returns on defined benefit plans for the period 
investigated. Although plan loans may increase participation, they do have the effect of affecting plans returns in the 
long run. The rationale used for individuals that defined contributions present them with avoidance of longevity 
risks faced by defined benefit plans does not find support in investment returns. A determining factor on 401 (k) 
plan returns is the gap between participant loan rate of interest, and plan rate of interest, and whether or not 
participants continue to make contributions during the loan repayment period (GOA, 1997). Weese (2009) suggests 
that there are advantages of a 401(k) loan such as a reduction of interest paid to outside lenders. In so doing 
participants are owners of funds withdrawn as a loan which will eventually is repaid with the accompanying interest. 
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An added feature is the low transaction costs. A key finding was that borrowing had the effect of increasing 
participation for low income employees (GAO 1997). EBRI data 1998-2008, suggests that in general borrowers of 
401(k) loans hold less worth, have more outstanding debt, and have less family income than those who do not 
borrow. (EBRI, 2009). A key finding of the GAO 1997 study shows that borrowing had the effect of increased 
participation particularly for low income employees and plans that feature a loan provision had an average increase 
of 35 percentage contribution rate compared to plans that do not allow borrowing. Less than eight percentage of 
participants had loans outstanding and borrowers were mostly minorities who could not borrow from other financial 
institutions or other workers covered by other pension plans (GOA, 1997). Studies conducted by EBRI support this 
finding where percentage of participants with outstanding loans shows very little variation from year to year. The 
US Department of Labor (1994) data also supports previous findings that loans tend to be a small amount of plan 
assets, and a small percentage of loans are converted into distributions for any given year.  
 
THE PORTABILITY EFFECT 
 
The portability factor in defined contribution plans is an important step that influences  preference of the 
plan. It is seen as an important step that allows employees to transfer payments from defined contribution 
distributions into Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA) accounts through a rollover feature. Most employees see 
this tax-free feature of rollovers as a significant factor in the portability of their defined contribution plans, where 
employees move their 401(k) plans from one employer to the next. Data from ICI (2010) lends support and show 
that as of 2007, rollovers accounted for $323 billion, a significant portion of flows into traditional IRAs. Employers 
also benefit where this portability feature frees them of the burden of monitoring the retirement funds left in a 
previous employer’s plan. Portability does have its costs. In applying the rules of ERISA, fiduciary obligation was 
removed from the employer and transferred to the employee under a defined contribution plan which accelerated the 
trend in defined contribution and its eventual growth. The defined contribution plan while allowing for portability, 
also entails longevity risk, which can be minimized by the use of annuity, and fluctuations or volatility on 
investment returns are all borne by employees. Gale, Iwry and Orszag (2005) notes that the results of the roll over 
feature allows for expansion of portable “ low cost accounts”  to individuals who for one reason or another do not 
have an IRA,  but were covered by an employer’s plan for a period. Quick (1999) suggests that the primary 
motivation for plan choice from defined benefit to a defined contribution, is a match of worker characteristics with 
those of a plan. We cannot deny that our society is comprised of a high degree of employee mobility, and a 
significant factor contributing to the current trend toward defined contribution plans is the fact that employees are 
convinced that the option of moving from one firm to the next and having the privilege of rolling over funds 
accumulated to another plan or an IRA is a better option than longevity risk with an uncertain future in a defined 
benefit plan. The sense of being in charge of one’s destiny as opposed to being determined by a trustee adds to the 
appeal.  
  
LONGEVITY REWARDS  
 
What if any are the rewards of the defined contribution plan? We could argue that on the surface, that it is 
the potential returns that an individual hopes to realize. This is only possible under good market conditions. We find 
in the data from the Watson Wyatt study that defined benefit plans out performed defined contribution plans for 
years 1996 -2006.  
 
The reality of rewards is illusive by nature. An important determinant of returns is market conditions. 
Under the defined contribution plan model, employees assume the fiduciary role in planning for retirement. This 
shifting of responsibility leaves the employee with only one alternative; which is dependence on the financial 
industry services. Having to rely on the experts in this industry the investing employee has no other choice but to 
embrace their advice and products. This situation is evident in model of the 401K plan with its attractive employer 
matching feature since the 1980s.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In analyzing the various studies that have addressed the growth of defined contribution we do not find plans 
returns to have significant influence. Loan availability although utilized, is not significant. Investment strategy as 
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employed by employees, clearly requires taking advantage of any and all avenues of financial education. The results 
of plan returns analyzed in this study points to the reality of this fact. So how can we as a society overcome this 
hurdle? Parker (2001) suggests that with the ever increasing growth rate of defined contribution plans, which are 
mostly invested in the stock market, any gains realized tend to distort traditional investment patterns. Investment 
experts concerned about the retirement crisis suggest that individuals such as holders of individual accounts, who 
typically invest in stocks, usually make purchases during their peak earning years. Upon retirement, stocks are sold 
to realize liquidity, and when this happens Parker suggests we will be on a collision course where stock prices 
decline for many years to come, and the so called artificial wealth created will disappear plunging the economy into 
a depression. This situation became evident when our economy experienced the market during the last two years. 
Managed wealth as is the case with the defined contribution plans, is within the control of large institutional 
investors who are measured on the basis of their performance. Parker (2001) notes that a very important fact 
overlooked in this measurement of performance is the fact that securities are subject to two kinds of returns. For the 
most part, investors look forward to those returns in the form of dividends, and also exogenous returns which are 
based on trader perception of future company profitability as well as other variables interacting within the external 
environment. Zall (2000) sees the main reason attributing to under savings for retirement as inaccurate forecasting of 
longevity. In assessing the growth of defined contribution plans it is well noted that more regulations forced 
employers to adopt the more flexible defined contribution that allowed employees to take control of their retirement 
funds. Supporters of the defined contribution plan, advocate that although the defined benefit plan may appear to 
have the promise of a more certain future with regard to risk, it is no more risk free than defined contribution plans. 
The difference here is that with the defined benefit, the risk is borne by both employer and employee. The reality for 
the employee is that promised funds may not be there upon retirement. The management of investment funds 
requires expert knowledge which most employees do not have or cannot afford. Financial companies who market 
their products, for individual accounts, may be more interested in making a profit as opposed to ensuring that future 
retirees reap the rewards of the “so called”, portability effects of the defined contribution plan.  
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Figure 1 - Plan Weighted Median Rates of Return 
Year Number of sponsors DB Plan 401(k) plan Difference 
2006 914 12.90% 11.34% 1.56% 
2005 2,584 7.74% 6.69% 1.05% 
2004 2,583 11.81% 9.80% 2.01% 
2003 2,514 21.35% 19.68% 1.67% 
2002 2,085 -8.56% -10.93% 2.37% 
2001 2,239 -3.78% -6.07% 2.29% 
2000 2,058 -0.01% -2.76% 2.75% 
1999 1,472 13.46% 14.41% -0.95% 
1998 2,958 14.25% 15.29% -1.04% 
1997 2,931 18.82% 19.73% -0.91% 
1996 3,034 14.53% 14.10% -0.43% 
1995 3,063 21.10% 19.20% 1.90% 
Average 
 
10.30% 9.21% 1.09% 
Source: Watson Wyatt 2007 
 
 
Author’s calculation using Watson Wyatt 2007 data 
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Figure 1a – Largest One Sixth Plans 
Year DB Plan 401(k) plan Difference 
2006 12.53% 11.20% 1.33% 
2005 7.20% 6.53% 0.67% 
2004 10.60% 9.48% 1.12% 
2003 20.65% 19.07% 1.58% 
2002 -8.73% -11.21% 2.48% 
2001 -4.10% -6.10% 2.00% 
2000 -0.32% -2.99% 2.67% 
1999 13.11% 16.08% -2.97% 
1998 13.68% 14.70% -1.02% 
1997 18.74% 18.44% -0.30% 
1996 14.30% 12.83% -1.47% 
1995 23.18% 18.29% 4.89% 
Average 10.07% 8.86% 1.21% 
Source: Watson Wyatt 2007 
 
 
Author’s calculation using Watson Wyatt 2007 data 
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Figure 2 – Largest One Half Plans 
Year DB Plan 401(k) plan Difference 
2006 11.98% 11.39 0.59% 
2005 6.72% 6.61% 0.11% 
2004 9.78% 9.39% 0.39% 
2003 18.95% 19.53% -0.58% 
2002 -8.60% -11.83% 3.23% 
2001 -3.94% -6.77% 2.83% 
2000 -0.32% -3.40% 3.08% 
1999 11.87% 15.32% -3.45% 
1998 13.37% 14.62% -1.25% 
1997 17.87% 17.97% -0.30% 
1996 14.30% 12.83% -0.10% 
1995 21.54% 17.63% 3.91% 
Average 9.43% 8.61% 0.82% 
Source: Watson Wyatt 2007 
 
 
Author’s calculation using Watson Wyatt 2007 data 
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Figure 2a – Smallest One Sixth Plans 
Year DB Plan 401(k) plan Difference 
2006 10.12% 11.59% 1.47% 
2005 5.42% 6.59% -1.17% 
2004 7.64% 9.23% -1.59% 
2003 14.70% 19.65% -4.95% 
2002 -8.02% -12.33% 4.31% 
2001 -3.51% -7.43% 3.92% 
2000 -1.43% -5.17% 6.60% 
1999 9.00% 16.11% -7.11% 
1998 9.87% 13.45% -3.58% 
1997 12.67% 16.43% -3.76% 
1996 10.63% 12.42% -1.79% 
1995 15.18% 16.94% -1.76% 
Average 7.09% 8.12% -1.03% 
Source: Watson Wyatt 2007 
 
 
Author’s calculation using Watson Wyatt 2007 data 
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Figure 3 
Year 
Participant Enrolled in Plans 
with Loan Features 
% with Loans 
Avg. Loan 
Balance 
Loan Balance as a Percentage of 
Account Balances 
2008 88% 18% 7,191 16% 
2007 90% 18% 7,495 12% 
2006 85% 18% 7,292 12% 
2005 85% 19% 6,821 13% 
2004 87% 19% 6,946 13% 
2003 86% 18% 6,839 13% 
2002 84% 17% 6,659 16% 
2001 84% 18% 6,644 14% 
2000 83% 18% 6,856 14% 
1999 82% 18% 6,815 14% 
1998 88% 16% 6,717 14% 
Source: EBRI 1998 – 2008 
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Figure 3a 
 
Author’s calculation using EBRI data 
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NOTES 
